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Abstract
Labour issues in global supply chains have been a thorny problem for both buyer firms and their suppliers. Research initially
focused mostly on the bilateral relationship between buyer firms and suppliers, looking at arm’s-length and close collaboration modes, and the associated mechanisms of coercion and cooperation. Yet continuing problems in the global supply chain
suggest that neither governance type offers a comprehensive solution to the problem. This study investigates collaborative
governance, an alternative governance type that is driven by buyer firms setting up a coalition with competitor firms to
increase leverage and address the supplier and/or host country-specific labour issues. Based on interviews with managers
involved in the establishment and management of such coalitions and supplier firms in the garment industry, we examine
the rationale behind collaborative governance and discuss its opportunities and challenges in addressing labour issues in
global supply chains.
Keywords Coalition · Corporate social responsibility · Global supply chains · Labour issues · Global value chain ·
Collaborative governance

Introduction
Labour rights violations in global supply chains have been a
vexing problem for buyer firms based in western countries.
Existing relationships with suppliers, whether at arm’slength or through close collaboration, have failed to produce
the desired solutions—considering, for instance, recent disasters in Bangladesh (Reinecke and Donaghey 2015). Media
feature many stories about the exploitation of employees,
under-age employment, sweat-shop labour conditions, and
health and safety violations in suppliers’ factories in less
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developed countries. Yet all this negative publicity has not
proved sufficient for buyer and supplier firms to resolve these
problems.
Over the years, it has been evidenced that top-down
approaches to controlling labour issues in supply chains are
ineffective (Neef 2004; Park-Poaps and Rees 2010). The
premise of relational governance has been to work with suppliers and enable them to develop the necessary capabilities
to address labour issues in supply chains. Although it may
be desirable and potentially effective, the relational approach
can only be rolled out in a limited number of relationships
due to the managerial attention and costs associated with
building up such relationships, and therefore, this has apparently not been effective enough to eradicate labour issues in
supply chains (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014). Similarly, if buyers merely demand that their suppliers meet certain standards, this often does not lead to desired outcomes
(Pedersen and Andersen 2006).
Acknowledging these limitations of unilateral and bilateral governance, firms have therefore scrambled to join
cross-sector collaborations called multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs). MSIs are generally initiated and driven by
societal actors and joined by stakeholders including governments, firms, trade unions and suppliers. Since their
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inception, MSIs have been considered to be a useful way
to overcome the limits of unilateral and bilateral governance mainly through the combination of complementing
resources and competences of participating organisations
(Fransen 2011). Some MSIs focus on establishing standards and developing monitoring mechanisms, while others
issue certificates and accreditations for certain qualifications (Utting 2002). Yet, of late, there have been growing
concerns and critical views on the effectiveness of such a
collaborative approach, although it can be hard to measure
their impact and performance (Egels-Zandén and Wahlqvist
2007; Fransen and Kolk 2007; Kolk 2013).
Although traditionally buyers hold significant power
over suppliers in the garment industry, some suppliers have
gained more power based on their enhanced production
resources and capabilities (Gereffi 2011). Therefore, switching costs for large and capable suppliers with a bigger client pool become smaller (Gereffi 2011). The interviews we
present also confirm that buyer firms believe that some suppliers have gained sufficient power in supply chains to reject
buyer initiatives; thus buyer firms have recently been taking
an alternative collaborative approach to cultivate the necessary power and legitimacy to coerce suppliers into acting
in accordance with ethical sourcing initiatives. Collective
actions are actions taken jointly by buyer firms “in pursuit
of the same collective good” (Marwell and Oliver 1993,
p. 4), i.e., improved working conditions. So the pendulum
may be swinging back from the trust-based model towards
a power-based model, driven by coercion and top-down
control but exercised through collaborative governance, not
direct bilateral relationships. This study is prompted by the
observation that buyers sharing the same supply base have
been establishing coalitions to coerce suppliers to adhere to
their standards.
We examine the emerging approach of collaborative
governance, tackling this main question: Why and when
do buyers from developed countries collaborate with peer
companies? In addition, we address the possible benefits
and challenges of such a model. The new approach raises
novel and interesting questions for scholarly research, that
go above and beyond existing scholarly work on global supply chain governance, which has mostly been focused on
bilateral firm-supplier relationships, e.g. captive, relational,
and modular relationships, and within-firm issues (Gereffi
et al. 2005). As value chain governance not only deals with
economic values but also with social values (Humphrey and
Schmitz 2001), collaborative governance is an alternative
way for firms to effectively govern labour issues. A main aim
of our paper is to compare collaborative governance with
these other, established bilateral ways of working (Gereffi
et al. 2005).
This approach involves collaboration of different organisations with conflicting interests, and firms risk knowledge
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spillovers to competitors. Hence, additional transaction costs
occur when organisations engage in collaborative governance (Nooteboom 2004). This is true for both buyer and
supplier firms, hence our conceptual question is when would
organisations be willing to bear such costs? This in turn begs
the question what drives partnership formation with competitors, and how does such partnering affect costs (Wootliff
and Deri 2001)? In our paper, which builds on interviews
with managers involved in the setting-up and management
of inter-firm supply-chain alliances and with suppliers based
in Hong Kong and India, as well as extensive secondary
data analysis, we examine the theoretical underpinnings of
these coalitions and critically discuss their effectiveness
in addressing labour issues in supply chains. In doing so,
we later seek to reconcile our exploratory findings with the
theory of value chain governance (Gereffi et al. 2005). Thus,
one scholarly contribution of our study is that we contrast
and compare collaborative governance with various bilateral
governance modes.
Existing literature sees reputational interdependency as a
strong driver of such buyer-led initiatives (BLIs) (e.g. Barnett and King 2008; Fauchart and Cowan 2014) and evaluates the effectiveness of collaborations based on factors and
dynamics of the participating buyers e.g. free-riding, opportunistic behaviours (e.g. Lenox and Nash 2003; Prakash and
Potoski 2007). The literature also looks at the legitimacy of
BLIs as private regulations (e.g. Egels-Zandén and Wahlqvist 2007; Vogel 2008). Yet, to the best of our knowledge,
there has not yet been a study into the phenomenon using the
conceptual perspective of supplier governance. Filling this
gap, a second contribution of our study is to the literature
on CSR in global supply chains, specifically in explicating
the conditions under which different governance modes are
appropriate. Finally, we contribute to the theory of global
value chains by highlighting an additional type of governance that, under the right conditions, is particularly useful
in addressing social issues in supply chains.
This study produces relevant insights for practitioners
too. Labour problems in supply chains are more than “minor
upstream inconveniences” (Jiang et al. 2009, p. 169). They
often receive wide media coverage and attract negative public interest. Several studies have reported that accusations
of unethical practices in supply chains may lead to erosion
of market positions and can result in substantial damage to
brands (Emmelhainz and Adams 1999; Frenkel and Scott
2002; Nelson and Zadek 2000). Acknowledging diverse
relationship dynamics in global supply chains, we provide
guidelines for practitioners to refer to when they decide on
the most suitable governance mode considering the power
dynamics with suppliers. In pursuit of effective and efficient
measures to tackle the problem, firms in a relatively weaker
position could proactively form and join alliances with
other firms that share the same supply base while carefully
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comparing potential opportunities and costs. Collaborative
governance thus provides managers with an additional repertoire to draw upon.
We proceed with more background on buyer–supplier
relationships and labour issues. Then, we introduce our
empirical research method, report the findings, and end with
a discussion and conclusions.

Background
Buyer–Supplier Relationships and Labour Issues:
Towards a New Coercive Model
In the 1970s, the footwear and apparel industry started a
trend of offshoring and outsourcing production to developing countries where abundant, cheap, low-skilled labour
was available (Lim and Phillips 2008). While this reduced
upstream costs, it also created a number of unintended
adverse consequences, including mistreatment and exploitation of labour in supplier firms (Emmelhainz and Adams
1999). Since the early 1990s, a series of irresponsible business practices in developing countries has provoked vigorous
criticism from the public and from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Kolk 2003). Household names, including
Nike, Walmart, Gap, and H&M, were held responsible for
sweatshop conditions in factories in the developing countries
where their branded goods were produced (Emmelhainz and
Adams 1999; Frost and Burnett 2007). As recently as 2012
and 2013, deadly fires in several supplier factories and the
collapse of the Rana Plaza complex in Bangladesh underscored the persistence of the problem (Wieland and Handfield 2013).
Firms initiated actions to combat such labour issues in
supply chains from the early 1990s onwards. In 1991, Levi
Strauss, followed by Nike in 1992, adopted firm-specific
codes of conduct and internal audits focusing specifically
on labour rights and working conditions (Murphy and Matthew 2001; Pedersen 2006; Roberts 2003; Van Tulder and
Kolk 2001). This practice became widespread as other firms
were subjected to strong institutional pressures (Jørgensen
et al. 2003).
Simultaneously there was a growing need for universally applicable standards, such as global reporting initiatives (GRI) and the UN Global Compact. These globally
applicable standards provide guidance for firms to prepare
standardised codes (Albareda 2013). And the application
of standards requires firm level action as firms share globally agreed codes of conduct and the implementation is still
expected to be carried out by individual firms, with little
need for collaboration between firms (Fransen 2011; Fransen
and Kolk 2007; Lund-Thomsen 2008; Rasche 2012). Even
though global standards can, albeit in a very limited way,

address the issues of one-sidedness and inconsistency of
corporate codes of conduct, the lack of specificity and the
absence of enforcement mechanisms still remain (Fransen
and Kolk 2007; Rasche 2010).
The limitations of codes, standards, and monitoring
could be overcome by a relational, trust-based approach
(Soundararajan and Brown 2016). Cooperation with suppliers includes ongoing two-way conversations, information
sharing, and training (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen 2009;
Lim and Phillips 2008; Locke et al. 2007). The assumption
here is that the proactive involvement of suppliers that strive
for a long-term relationship may lead to better compliance
(Dyer and Singh 1998; Lim and Phillips 2008). However,
the collaborative approach is complicated by the globalization of supply chains, where buyer firms source their products from several suppliers that can be located in different
countries and suppliers also serve multiple buyers (Utting
2002). This makes it costly and almost impossible to build
and sustain cooperative relationships across supply chains
that may include hundreds of suppliers (Lund-Thomsen and
Lindgreen 2014).
In parallel, multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) emerged;
MSI is a broad concept and includes private organizations,
i.e. firms, competitors, NGOs, and trade unions, as well as
governments, and is initiated and driven by societal actors/
organisations in the majority of cases (Baur and Schmitz
2012; O’Rourke 2006; Rasche 2012). Over time, MSIs have
evolved and now include a number of standards, monitoring mechanisms and accreditation for certain qualifications
(Fransen 2011; Utting 2002). Representative examples of
MSIs include ethical trading initiatives (ETI), FLA (fair
labour association), and social accountability international
(SAI). ETI is run by its membership and members adopt
the ETI base code in pursuit of improvement of workers’
rights (Utting 2002). FLA is driven by universities and civil
society organisations aiming to resolve labour issues mainly
through setting standards and conducting external audits and
accrediting companies. SAI is a multi-stakeholder organisation that has established SA8000 to promote labour rights
and decent working conditions around the globe. Although
there are a number of MSIs, even overlapping in terms of
purposes and functions, they have not fully resolved issues
in global supply chains and are often criticised for the lack of
enforcement mechanism and for being abstract and nominal
institutions that simply issue membership certificates and
accreditations (Utting 2002).
One of the main causes of continuing problems, either
with corporate or global standards, is the governance of supply chains (e.g. monitoring, audits and remedial actions) that
eventually boils down to individual firms. Suppliers seldom
welcome investigation through audits (Morali and Searcy
2012). Audits are costly and smaller buyer firms and suppliers often do not have the financial or human resources
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needed for repeated audits (Ciliberti et al. 2011; Utting
2002). In addition, it is easy for suppliers to deceive the
buyer if repeat audits take place sporadically and last only a
few days (Egels-Zandén 2014; Plambeck and Taylor 2016).
Acknowledging the real-life difficulties and limitations
of existing governance mechanisms, a different type of collaboration is emerging that is co-led by competing buyers
in an effort to increase leverage over suppliers as well as
the level of dependence by suppliers, to eventually induce
a higher level of compliance and cooperation. Generally,
firms enter into an alliance when they foresee a strategic or
financial benefit in doing so (Kale et al. 2002), including
firms in vulnerable positions (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven
1996). Buying firms that account for only a small amount
of the total production of a supplier are an example of such
a position as they lack enforcement mechanisms. Thus, they
ally with each other and combine their resources, relative
power to the suppliers, to increase their leverage (Das and
Teng 2000). For resources they cannot obtain through intrasector collaboration, they pursue cross-sector collaboration,
specifically by reaching out to NGOs and accessing their
expertise (Rondinelli and London 2003). As such, participating firms and NGOs complement each other in collaborative
governance.
This new governance mode has been categorised as
a sub category of MSI that is often called a business (or
industry)-driven initiative (BDI); in this study we use the
term collaborative governance to conceptually differentiate
it from the other forms of MSI and to focus on its benefits
and drawbacks. Collaborative governance involves multiple parties but is characterised by proactive and collective
actions driven by businesses, not by societal actors/organizations. Collaborative governance is more focused in terms
of attempts to address specific issues, gathering around a
shared supply base rather than trying to develop a cure-all.
This aims to coerce suppliers and curb their potential opportunism with very specific purposes, target suppliers/countries/issues; in so doing it is assumed that buyer firms reduce
the chances that labour problems will occur, or at least lower
their severity. Coercive strategies take the form of “threats,
promises, and/or legalistic pleas” (Frazier et al. 1989, p.59).
The assumption here is that the threat of punitive action is
more effective if it comes from a collective rather than from
a single firm.

Method
To understand how this collaborative governance model
operates, we conducted an exploratory study. An exploratory qualitative study is appropriate, given limited existing
knowledge on this topic and our focus to theorize around it,
rather than formally test hypotheses. For the first phase of
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our study, we selected study participants, who were identified from firms that were actively engaged with collaborative
governance. Firms had to meet three key criteria for inclusion in this study. First, labour issues in supply chains had
to be a relevant problem for them, as expressed in the media
or public debate. Second, their annual or standalone CSR
reports had to demonstrate that they were actively seeking
some solution(s) to address these issues. Third, they had to
be a part of a formal coalition or alliance addressing labour
issues in supply chains.
For our empirical investigation, we chose the retail
clothes sector because of its long history with labour issues
in supply chains. Clothing retailers have borne the brunt of
public criticism and media scrutiny over labour issues in
their suppliers’ factories. The companies selected for the
first phase of our research varied in size, target consumer,
and ownership type, as shown in Table 1. This diversity was
intentional to enable us to capture the drivers for the formation of alliances and the differentiated impact on management of people at supplier factories. Through snowballing
we included in our interviews NGOs frequently mentioned
in earlier interviews with buyer firms. Given our interest in
how firms seek to exploit collaborative governance, most
interviews were with firm representatives.
Primary data were acquired from interviews with firm
representatives in charge of CSR policies in supply chains,
managers from NGOs and suppliers. Interviews were semistructured and centred on collaborative strategies to address
labour issues in supply chains. The organisations and interviewees are not revealed, to protect their identity. The company names are denoted by alphabets to anonymise them
(see Table 2). Extensive secondary data were collected to
corroborate the interview data and included firms’ archived
documents, other organisations, online sources, and the
media. Interviewees’ responses were compared, confirmed,
or challenged by these documents so we could avoid method
bias through triangulation (Podsakoff et al. 2012). The
sources for our data are shown in Table 3.
Thus, in phase one of our data collection process, we
conducted 11 interviews with CSR/sustainable-sourcing
representatives from UK and Danish retailers, a representative of an MSI and a representative of a supplier
company (Hong Kong based). After an initial preliminary
analysis of our data to the initial set of questions in phase
1 interesting areas emerged leading to further questions,
such as: What difficulties do suppliers face in ensuring
decent work; how do they experience the multiple economic and social pressures by buying companies; would
suppliers welcome a changed approach where their buyers will jointly engage them? Furthermore, it made sense
to corroborate the buyer-side findings with some supplier
data; even though our research question focuses on buyer
strategies, we wanted to rule out biases these buyers might
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Table 1  Summary of interviews (phase 1)
Period

November 2014–June 2016

Types
Duration (range)
Firms
Products served
Types
Number of interviewees
Designations of interviewees

Face-to-face (2), skype (4), phone (3), written (2)
30–90 min
Apparel, footwear, home products, food, luxury fashion
Public (3), private (3)
9
Director of sustainable business, head of sustainable business, head of
responsible sourcing, former manager of international distribution, CSR
program manager, former ethical sourcing coordinator, CSR manager,
ethical trading team
UK, Denmark, Hong Kong
10,000–80,000
$2000 million–$10 billion

Country
Number of employees (range)
Firm revenue (range)
Non-profit enterprise
Description
Number of interviewees
Designation of interviewee
Multi-stakeholder initiative
Description
Number of interviewees
Designations of interviewee

Pursuing transparency across supply chain by implementing technologies
1
Director/founder
Providing a forum for firms, trade unions, and NGOs to share best practices
1
China representative

Table 2  Characteristics of the sample companies in phase 1
Company ID Type

Origin

Ownership

Company A
Company B
Company C
Company D
Company E
Company F

UK
UK
UK
UK
Denmark
Hong Kong

Public
Public
Public
Private
Private
Private

Multinational retailer
Retailer
Luxury brand
Fashion brand
Retailer
Garment manufacturing
supplier

have in reporting on a sensitive topic like this. Thus, we
embarked on a second phase of data collection, where we
conducted more interviews with informants from suppliers
and suppliers’ suppliers. The characteristics of the sample

companies, data source, the list of informants/interviewees and summary of interviews in phase two is detailed
in Table 4.

Analysis and Findings
Guided by the theoretical thematic analysis process suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006), the in-depth data analysis of data from both phases began with sufficiently familiarising with the collected interview data. This first step
entails thorough transcription of all verbal expressions and
repeated readings of the transcripts. The transcribed interview data were first coded and divided into concepts. The
concepts were mostly predetermined, based on a literature
review, and guided the interview processes. The concepts

Table 3  Data sources (phase 1)
Data source

Details

Interviews

11 interviews with current/former CSR practitioners of different organisations including retail companies, NGOs, and
a supplier, conducted face-to-face, by Skype, telephone and written communication. Further details can be found in
Table 1
35 reports published by the companies interviewed between 2000 and 2016, e.g. CSR reports, sustainability reports,
human rights reports, codes of conduct
CSR, ethical trading and partnership information available on the websites of the companies interviewed
469 articles and commentaries published by the media 2000–2016, accessed from the FACTIVA database and Google
searches/Google Scholar

Corporate reports
Company websites
Published news articles
and scholarly articles
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Table 4  Characteristics of the sample companies in phase 2
Company ID

Type

Origin

Ownership

Designations of interviewees

Company G
Company H
Company I
Company J
Company K
Company L

Garment material supplier
Garment material supplier
Garment material supplier
Garment material supplier
Garment material supplier
Garment material supplier

India
US
Bangladesh
India/Sri Lanka
India
India

Private
Private
Private (family owned)
Private
Private (family owned)
Private

Director of Procurement and CSR
Director of Sales and CSR
Director of Procurement and CSR
CEO
Director of Business Development
CEO

were then reorganized and regrouped as categories. The
categories were chosen as they were the most predominantly and frequently mentioned aspects from the data set,
which were broadly about challenges in current practices
and efforts to address the issues. And they were agreed by
the co-authors who independently read the data. Next, the
data extracts were displayed with categories, and all extracts
were compared to reveal similarities, patterns, and causality
(Miles and Huberman 1994). Through this approach, four
main overarching themes: drivers, implementation, implications for labour issues, and challenges, and eight sub-themes
were identified. At this stage, to ensure the homogeneity of
data extracts under the same themes and the heterogeneity
of the different themes, there was a recursive reading back
and forth between the data set and the data extracts (Patton
1990).

number of suppliers are gaining power through their competencies, and these dynamics lead to modular governance
(Gereffi et al. 2005). As value chain governance includes
‘how’ products are made (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001), not
only the transaction-specific factors but also labour issues
have been dealt with mainly by the three governance modes.
The analysis of the interview data reveals that the three value
chain governance modes, captive, relational, and modular,
are indeed of use in addressing labour issues in the garment
industry supply chains as suggested by Gereffi et al. (2005)
(see Table 5). However, since all of these modes are not
free of limitations, buyer firms opt for collaborative governance to address two major interrelated issues: inverted power
asymmetry and informational asymmetry.

Drivers for Collaborative Governance

The garment industry is typically considered to be the place
where captive governance is operative since a buyer has less
dependence and a supplier has higher dependence on the
relationship. This case might seem better, as it is now the
buyer who has the power. However, all of our interviewees affirmed that simply auditing, monitoring, and enforcing buyer regulations would not improve working conditions or labour rights in factories. Continuous support and

The governance of global value chains of the garment industry has been categorised into two major types; (a) the captive
type where focal firms hold absolute power over suppliers
and (b) the relational type where the relationship between
focal firms and suppliers are established based on mutual
trust (Gereffi et al. 2005). Of late, however, an increasing

Power Asymmetry

Table 5  Governance types, characteristics, effectiveness
Governance types

Characteristics
Power asymmetry
Opportunities
Challenges
Applicability of standards and programmes
Corporate
e.g. NIKE corporate code of conduct
Global
e.g. SA8000, GRI, UN global compact
Supplier-/issue-specific
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Captive

Relational

Modular

Collaborative

High (B > Ss)
High compliance
Opportunistic behaviours of suppliers

Low (B ≈ S)
High cooperation
Difficult to develop
and maintain

Low (Bs ≤ Ss)
High (Bs ≥ S)
Low switching costs
High compliance
Low motivations for sup- Difficult to reach
pliers to comply
consensus among
buyers

High

High

Low

–

High

High

Low-medium

Medium

–

High

–

High
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communication are necessary, since otherwise the supplier
might simply try to cheat and manipulate data. A supplier
which is not fully convinced of the need for improvements
is easily tempted toward guile instead of making efforts to
address issues. As the director of sustainable business of
Company A put it:
I think we need to have minimum standards. But that
will never be enough to drive the transformation that
we want to see… And what we found really successful
is that we find ways to inspire our suppliers so that they
believe this is good for their business.
The analysis of secondary data reveals that some of the firms
in the study have as few as 200 suppliers and others nearly
700 (2016 CSR report, Company A; 2016 CSR report,
Company D). The suppliers are dispersed around the globe,
from 29 to 41 countries. Given that some big suppliers own
multiple factories, the number of factory sites that require
audits and monitoring increases exponentially. For example, one of the firms in our study had around 200 suppliers
using 800 factory sites (2016 CSR report, Company D) and
another had 662 suppliers and used 1965 factory sites (2016
CSR report, Company B). At the same time, the number of
suppliers used is increasing over time. These figures do not
include sub-suppliers, and the numbers will dramatically
increase when taking sub-suppliers into account. According to our analysis of firms’ reports, most of the firms do
not fully complete annual audits for individual factory sites.
Company C, working with the smallest number of factories, claims it completed 100% audits in 2015 (2016 CSR
report, Company D), while the firm with the largest number of suppliers recorded 49% completion in the same year
(2016 CSR report, Company A). Our analysis of the reports
demonstrates how unlikely it is for firms to communicate
with every single supplier and convince them to responsibly
run their factories when they are not able to complete oneoff audits.
Moreover, considering that in most cases, the suppliers
are in countries that are politically, economically, and legally
less developed, interviewees reported that the problem is not
always with suppliers not wanting to fix issues, but with their
governments and society not pushing them or supporting
them sufficiently to do so. In this case, the proactive involvement of buyers plays a more significant role. As the China
representative of an NGO confirms:
Social auditing is very corruptive in China. So the idea
is really to go beyond social auditing and to have really
workers’ engagement and invest money on capacity
building instead of just monitoring repetitively and
meaninglessly.
In principle, relational governance based on a cooperative relationship can reduce transaction costs and enhance

value outcomes (Atrek et al. 2014; Dyer 1997; Dyer and
Singh 1998; Uzzi 1997). Mutual trust and/or commitment
is required for cooperation between a buyer and a supplier
(Morgan and Hunt 1994). Most of the interviewees confirmed that their firms have policies to develop and help
suppliers to enhance working conditions in their factories.
They try to build trusting relationships by ensuring suppliers that they will not abandon the relationship, asking for
commitment from suppliers in return. When they become
aware of issues such as child labour, unethical behaviour or
illegal discrimination, and safety violations, they give the
factories time and, if necessary, resources to address them.
Once there is evidence that suppliers are willing to make an
effort to improve, the brands try to support them. A CSR
program manager of Company B described their approach:
What we have to do is to send them a clear message
that we are going to work with them. We have local
teams. We are not going to charge them for all the
advice and support. We do free training every month.
In China, we do age verification, management systems, working hour training, all screening, every single month, in three different locations. We provide the
support, the advice, the expertise, the knowledge.
Similarly, the director of sustainable business of Company
A noted:
Our policy is not to just walk away from suppliers. I
think there’s different situations, when we check on the
suppliers on board, we recognize that they will take
some time to get to the standard that we want…. But
as long as we can see evidence of improvement and
that they share the same set of values and the same
aspiration to get to the standard, we will continue to
work with them because we believe that’s the most
responsible approach.
On a similar note, a former ethical sourcing coordinator of
Company C reported:
We continuously work with them and talk to them
face-to-face or on the phone to help them to achieve
those things. It’s not like we impose a policy on them.
But we actually work with them all the time so they
can improve themselves.
Relational governance is probably the best and ideal way to
address labour issues. A brand and a supplier make attempt
to work together and cooperate on a basis of mutual trust and
commitment. However, this is almost exclusively possible
in a relationship where both parties are highly dependent on
each other. In the garment retail industry, where manufacturing requires few brand-specific skills, most suppliers serve
multiple buyers, and at the same time brands are likely to
source products from multiple suppliers. Therefore, rather
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than long-term relationships, we mostly find arm’s-length
relationships, in which either the buyer or the supplier is less
dependent on the relationship, or neither party is particularly
reliant on the relationship.
Perhaps surprisingly, buyer firms in the industry perceive
large suppliers as having acquired substantial power over
them. Large suppliers have the capacity to supply many
brands simultaneously and are, therefore, less receptive to
pressure from buyer firms. Switching costs are reported to be
very high for buyers, because the initial investment in finding and establishing a relationship with the right suppliers
is substantial (Harms et al. 2013). Unless they do invest a
sufficient amount of searching costs, they are likely to end up
with similar problematic suppliers (Wieland and Handfield
2013). Our respondents, therefore, challenged the notion that
buyers dominate the supply chain. This is evidenced by the
head of responsible sourcing of Company A:
I think where it is typically challenging is where you
have no leverage. So if you buy very, very little from
the supplier, it’s at the very beginning of the relationship, and maybe you have been buying there for a couple of weeks, it’s therefore very difficult to influence
that organisation to make change happen.
Under this kind of scenario, pressure might even give the
supplier an incentive to leave the relationship, as noted by
the director of sustainable business of Company A:
… they [suppliers] will probably not want to supply us
anyways because more and more suppliers can choose
who they sell products to.
The last scenario where neither party is dependent on a relationship, which makes market governance come into play, is
not discussed as a governance mode in the garment industry
by Gereffi et al. 2005) but in fact common in practice. And
in such relationships, addressing labour issues is rarely prioritised. When an issue is detected, the easiest and simplest
option for a buyer firm is to exit the relationship. Considering the low level of dependence, finding a new supplier that
has the capacity to produce the same goods is not likely to be
problematic. But, as we pointed out earlier, it is highly likely
that an alternative supplier’s operations will have similar
issues. Hence, the buyer firm has an incentive to try and find
a way to address the issue and keep current relationships.
However, a supplier’s low level of dependence significantly
reduces the supplier’s incentive to comply and increases the
likelihood that the supplier will exit the relationship.
One of the firms in our study reported that 38 relationships out of 1965 were terminated due to non-compliance
in 2015 (2016 CSR report, Company B). Company C had to
leave its Chinese supplier in 2012 when it was discovered
that the supplier was exploiting workers. The supplier was
producing for multiple Western customers and Company C
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was sourcing only 3% of the supplier’s entire production,
and which means low dependence from the supplier on the
relationship. Neither of the two companies provided any
detailed reasons for the extreme decisions in the report, but
the interviews and secondary data indicate that those decisions are usually made when suppliers show little intention
to address labour issues at their sites.
One of the firms reported that 80% of their products are
made by the top 10% of suppliers, while they source small
amounts from the rest of the suppliers (2016 CSR report,
Company D) and these relationships are likely to be arm’slength, where conversation and persuasion are not likely to
work. Two respondents also acknowledged that this approach
is only effective with a limited number of key suppliers:
In Bangladesh, our top three suppliers are quite big.
They have grown with [our organisation]. So we are
a very large customer and we have been collaborating
with them ever since we started going into Bangladesh. So here we have a lot of leverage. And we are
not demanding or asking them to do specific things.
We are having an open and honest and equal dialogue
about how to improve things.
I think key suppliers, normally, they appear to be good
also at CSR.
The same applies to suppliers as well. Company F in our
study, a Hong Kong-based supplier, remarks in its sustainability report that it collaborates only with key clients (2016
Sustainability report, Company F). In the same sense, the
interviews with suppliers also confirmed that the suppliers
tend to more actively engage in the requirements from bigger
buyer than from smaller ones (Company I, J, K).
Power asymmetry is more pronounced with relatively
small buyer firms. Even though one of the firms in our study
is a well-established and well-known brand, some of its
larger suppliers consider it a small buyer, and it, therefore,
has little power over them. As the director of sustainable
business in Company A stated:
The challenges are though [our firm] like many retailers has very few sites where we are the only or a very
significant customer. In most sites we are one of many
customers….
Similarly, one of our interviewees, a former ethical sourcing
coordinator of Company C, stressed the difficulty of applying power:
We are just a tiny company so we have to work with so
many different brands to achieve some common goal.
For these firms overcoming power asymmetry and enforcing practices on suppliers can only happen if buyers using
the same suppliers come together to collaborate, to increase
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the level of suppliers’ dependence, and consequently exert
leverage over them.
Considering that high dependence on the relationship is
likely to induce cooperative strategies while low dependence
makes a party less cooperative, the dependence of suppliers matters more than the level of buyers’ dependence on
the relationship, which challenges the common belief that
buyers always play a decisive role. Although game theory
suggests that through repetition of the same games parties
would eventually learn that cooperation gives them higher
pay-offs (Axelrod 1984; Jones 1995), in the global garment
industry, where buyers and suppliers have to take care of
multiple relationships dispersed across countries, such
focused repetition between the two parties is not a viable
option. In short, bilateral governance, either captive or
relational and of course market governance, could not be
expected to resolve problems with CSR in most of the relationships we looked at.
Having realised the limitations of governing global supply chains individually, buyer firms have come up with an
idea for a new kind of collaboration, in the form of collaborative governance. By forming an inter-firm alliance,
firms access the resource that are not available otherwise
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996), relative power over
supplier. This type of governance is therefore expected to
be especially useful for the firms that are facing difficulties
since suppliers are not sufficiently dependent on the relationship. Firms in alliance now can integrate their power
and ultimately increase their leverage (Das and Teng 2000).
This move to collaborative governance is prompted by the
need to shift power from suppliers to buyers, as this at least
promises the second-best result.
Information Asymmetry
Interviewees confirmed that suppliers have better and more
information about what goes on in their factories than buyers. A number of factors cause this information asymmetry.
Interviewees suggested that suppliers have an information
advantage because of geographical distance and the lack of
transparency in information process across supply chains
where critical information is often withheld. Respondents
also frequently cited the cost associated with acquiring
information. Our interviewees reported that buyer firms
allocated limited budgets to CSR issues in the supply chain.
For instance, the former ethical sourcing coordinator of
Company C told us:
Sometimes we want to visit the place and it’s too far
and we don’t have enough budget, so we cannot go and
talk to them. So it can lead to communication breakdown because we cannot communicate with them. It’s

too far. We cannot see them and we cannot see the
farms and actual factories.’
Physical distance generates problems even when a brand has
power over a supplier. Most interviewees expressed concerns
about short-burst audits and said they distrusted them, as they
are considered to be little more than box-ticking exercises,
with limited understanding of suppliers’ day-to-day activities.
The China representative of the NGO said:
Audits will always be a snapshot of the day and it is not
a tool for improvement, it is a tool for control. Not only
are audits incapable of capturing actual practices, but
also the results are sometimes not trustworthy for deeply
rooted, country-specific factors.
In addition to suppliers withholding information, interviewees reported that cultural issues lay behind some of the problems with information asymmetry. Most suppliers are based
in Asian countries where people are more hesitant to bring
bad news, and in order to save face tend not to discuss what
went wrong and what caused failure at suppliers’ factories. The
China representative of a NGO said:
…[T]hat makes it more difficult to try and find causes
and therefore come up with good solutions. So these are
some of the challenges especially around issues around
safety or worker conditions. … We recommend [our]
members not to do the social auditing repetitively. …
[A]uditing is very corrupted in China.
Data also suggest that buyers and suppliers both suffer from
audit fatigue. Constrained by limited resources, buyer firms
have to conduct audits on multiple suppliers’ operations and
at the same time suppliers have to go through several buyer
audits. This creates additional costs at both ends. Individuals
involved in audits are often bogged down with paper work,
with little insight into the real working conditions of suppliers.
Through collaborative governance, firms can access information that other firms have on labour practices in a shared supply base, which saves costs for participating firms. The CSR
programme manager of Company B explains that collaborative
governance could have an impact on reducing the number and
frequency of excessive and unnecessary audits while increasing the effectiveness of them:
Why are we all having our own audits? Why are some
factories being audited 10–15 times a year? But the auditors, they have a checklist where 95% of the questions
are the same. Why not have system where we all trust
one type of audit and then leave the factories in peace to
develop, instead of just taking days out of the calendar
for audits so many times a year?…It is about sharing.
It’s the key
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Implementation
There is consensus among our interviewees that brands
alone cannot solve labour issues in supply chains. They
need assistance from a party that specializes in local contexts and specific issues. As a result, they need NGOs
in a inter-firm coalition, but acting as complementors
instead of initiators. The aim is to combine complementary resources, meaning the brands’ financial muscle with
NGOs’ knowledge and experience in dealing with labour
issues. (Rondinelli and London 2003). There is a strong
belief that such joint approaches will ultimately address
labour issues by coercing particular suppliers, industries,
and even governments, into action. As a former ethical
sourcing coordinator of Company C noted:
We will work with other brands. So we will find out
if other brands are using the supplier as well. And
then we will try to have a meeting with other brands
and the supplier together. And then we will also ask
an NGO to join because they are the third party and
they can give some fair comments and they know a
lot about that specific issue.
Tasks once performed by buyer firms are now allocated to
NGOs. For instance, firms in our study partner with one
NGO to carry out employee surveys at suppliers’ factories.
One of the interviewees explained that her organisation
uses the services of the NGO whenever there is a need to
obtain information directly from workers, to avoid workers being forced into cooperation or being manipulated
by factory owners. The NGO has developed a platform
to approach and contact workers outside factories, using
text messages or landlines at home, to obtain a realistic
picture of working conditions. Data are also collected via
questionnaires sent via mobile phones provided by the
NGO that are not accessible by suppliers’ management.
This may alleviate employees’ concerns about retaliation
from their employers. The director of the NGO argued
that the brands that sign up for this service are those that
are most dedicated to resolving issues. This service helps
these brands to identify issues and put into place appropriate measures to address them, before they lead to major
incidents.
Brands have also been working with multiple NGOs when
problems are observed in their supply chains. For example,
when one of the firms in our study found out that children
were employed in the manufacturing of clothes for its brand,
instead of cancelling the contract or dissuading the supplier
from using under-age workers, they asked a partner NGO
to step in. Thanks to its expertise and embeddedness in the
local institutional context, the NGO was able to provide a
holistic solution that not only enables the children to go to
school, but also supports the family for loss of income.
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Representatives of firms in the alliance meet regularly to
address the social issues they face. The aim is to agree on
common ways to approach these challenges and interact with
shared supply base. The process is described by an NGO
representative:
They need to bring together all the brands sourcing
from the same factory to deliver that message and
use that leverage to influence their suppliers. So they
need some kind of common action and consistency on
issues. … It’s much stronger than only for example a
small brand to deliver a single message to a single supplier. It’s really to maximize the leverage of the whole
industry to influence suppliers in a country.

Implications
Social issues are complex, especially in multi-level global
supply chains (Selsky and Parker 2005). Under some circumstances collaborative governance involving multiple
buyers and other parties can be an effective alternative for
tackling the issues, because (a) buyers exchange knowledge
on shared supply base; and (b) they circumvent problems
with limited or one-sided dependence in supply chains.
One of the biggest benefits of collaborative governance
is that participating companies can share information on
labour practices of shared suppliers. The largest UK retailers (including a firm in our study), came up with an idea to
establish a platform named Supplier Ethical Data Exchange
(SEDEX) where brands can share audit information about
suppliers and effectively reduce audit fatigue. As the head
of responsible sourcing of Company A explains:
‘We’ve got a problem of audit duplication, let’s
invite couple of other key retailers to help us how we
address that’. And that’s what led us to the formation
of SEDEX.
In their 2017 annual report, SEDEX highlights the significant achievement in terms of the increased identification
and sharing of information on risky practices of suppliers
(Sedex 2017). Yet, SEDEX is about more than just sharing
information. Using the information available through the
SEDEX platform, firms can initiate collaboration as they
now know who else is using the same suppliers. Again, the
head of responsible sourcing of Company A explained the
usefulness of SEDEX:
If it’s an expensive change, it’s not easy to influence
that if the expensive change is going to be significantly
more than the profit they are going to make on making
the product. So that’s why we work with the organisations like SEDEX where you can get other purchasers
who are also purchasing from that same site to perhaps
influence the owner to make the change.
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Fair factories clearinghouse (FFC) works in a similar way
but is driven by US retailers. FFC has focused on developing
sophisticated methods to monitor and manage compliance
and ultimately aims to use the combined leverage to enhance
practices in the shared supply base.
The impact of collaborative governance can go beyond
influencing suppliers. Labour issues are often not caused
by suppliers but by underpinning country level institutional
characteristics (Fransen 2013). Often national institutions
supersede regulations established by private firms and/or
MSIs (Utting 2002). As such, one further role of a coalition
is to lobby governments. Fundamental changes in labour
practices can only be expected when national institutions
change (Utting 2002). All of the buyer firms we interviewed
confirmed and emphasized the importance of their coalition in influencing a range of stakeholders in their suppliers’
home countries. The CSR manager of Company A noted:
If a coalition that is representing a large part of the
country’s export goes to the government of course they
can’t and will not just act exactly as industry is telling them but it has of course some influence on how
they will make decisions in the future. … We have cosigned letters to the Bangladeshi government. I know
the delegations have gone there also with brand representatives, and the minimum wage has been raised.
I think 60% or something. Of course then everything
else also gets more expensive. House rent, food, everything. But it has an influence, of course it has that.
Similarly, the CSR programme manager of Company B and
the head of sustainable business of Company A told us:
If you look at collaboration, as brands, who has economic power? The brands. We do. We have the money;
we have the resource; we are the catalyst to make this
happen. If we come together, strategically, collaboratively. How many billions do you think the brands
source from the countries? You think they don’t have
influence, leverage? Of course, they do.
We learn together, we increasingly work together,
… so together we are stronger. … What I am saying
is things can change. If you really want to you can
change. What it requires is brands come together….
Table 5 enables a comparison between the different governance types that exist in the garment industry and draws
on the work of Gereffi et al. (2005). Gereffi et al. (2005)
describe three types of bilateral governance; we describe
each of these and contrast them with collaborate governance as found in our exploratory study above. Under captive governance, focal firms can use their own codes of
conduct and/or adopt global standards established by reputable organisations. Due to the power dynamic favouring

buyers, the level of compliance with standards and policies
is likely to be high, although there still is a chance that
suppliers will act in an opportunistic way, taking advantage of physical distance and infrequent audits.
Although it is difficult to achieve, once the relationship
between a buyer and a supplier is built on a solid foundation, the supplier tends to adhere to standards. The buyer
and supplier could even jointly develop and tailor standards and programmes. This is a good way of dealing with
labour issues in global supply chains if firms are willing
to bear the setup costs.
On the other hand, the relative power of some large
and highly capable suppliers tends to be stronger as is
the case in modular governance (Gereffi et al. 2005), and
stronger suppliers are less likely to be responsive to buyers’ requirements, and compliance with individual corporate code of conduct is likely to be lower (Handfield and
Bechtel 2002).
Transitions from captive to modular governance are
largely determined by transaction-relevant factors including complexity and codifiability of transactions and suppliers’ capabilities (Gereffi et al. 2005). However, as detailed
in this paper, firms have been engaging in a different kind
of governance mode to tackle social issues in global supply chains. In collaborative governance, where focal firms
combine their resources, it is less likely that participating
companies choose to apply the code of conduct of one of
the participants; instead they design new standards (specifically designed for the supplier/country) or use existing
global standards. For example, the business social compliance initiative (BSCI), a coalition exclusively open for buyers, decided to create a more specific but harmonised code
of conduct, using global standards such as ILO conventions
only as a guideline (Egels-Zandén and Wahlqvist 2007;
Fransen 2011). In practice, the compliance level of the suppliers under the influence of BSCI has shown significant
improvement (Hogstetter and Mueller 2013).

Challenges
One of the interviewees, a manager of Company K, confirmed that the company is part of collaborative governance
and sees it positively as it ‘makes good business sense’. Yet,
the shifting approach we describe here is not without downside risks. First, buyers participating in such partnership
are likely to have different contract details with the shared
suppliers. Balancing confidentiality with appropriate disclosure of competitive information such as price structures
and product quality. Buyer firms negotiate different contracts
with suppliers. This affects the level of information sharing
between buyer firms. As a former ethical sourcing coordinator of Company C put it:
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And actually the difficult thing is with other businesses, we cannot share everything with each other.
There’s always this question, ‘How much should we
share with other brands?’ It creates difficulty in achieving a common goal of trying to be more sustainable
or environmentally friendly, or more ethical. So that’s
the challenge.
The issue with confidentiality could also be a problem
between firms and NGOs in cases where NGOs are invited
to join, considering that they have fundamentally different
agendas (Rivera-Santos and Rufín 2010). In order for firms
to be open to NGOs about their problems with suppliers,
there should be a belief that such information will not be
used to attack them (Rivera-Santos and Rufín 2010; Rondinelli and London 2003). At the same time, for NGOs to
participate, they should believe that involvement will not
harm their reputation (Rondinelli and London, 2003). Thus,
mutual trust among participating organisations is crucial
for the success of collaborative governance.Furthermore “a
chain is only as strong as its weakest link.” Differences in the
levels of motivation and expectation of buyers joining the
coalition pose another major challenge. Those at the higher
end with large margins are willing to tolerate an increase in
labour costs, while those with low margins are more sensitive to increases in the cost of labour. These differences tend
to drive firms in the coalition toward the lower standards
as such different levels of commitments from parties in a
relationship could cause lowered productivity of the alliance
(Rondinelli and London 2003). A CSR programme manager
of Company B observed:
Because you’ve got 10 companies in a room and five
of them want to do something good, three of them
say, ‘Okay, whatever’, and one of them only wants to
do this much. You can only do as much as the one that
says ‘I wanna do this much.’ So they only do what the
lowest wants.
When it comes to the governance of supplier practices, the
collective coercive approach helps to push through uniform
regulations and standards, which reduces suppliers’ ability to
resist buyer firms’ demands, but at the same time heightens
suppliers’ perceived sense of unfairness. Thus, coercion has
the potential to provoke invisible resistance from suppliers.
For instance, because of fear of retaliation or termination
of contracts, instead of engaging openly in discussions of
buyer firms’ demands that would benefit both parties, suppliers may revert to well-documented window-dressing strategies. Lastly, issues related to sub-suppliers are not explicitly addressed in the collaborative governance model. Even
suppliers in our interviews which agree that collaborative
governance works, find controlling sub-suppliers challenging. Most interviewees state that they are required by buyers
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to ask sub-suppliers to meet the same standards but do not
monitor them due to the lack of coordination and resources.
This calls for further research to examine the real impact of
the emerging approach on labour practices at sub-suppliers.

Discussion
Given the significant impact of negative publicity that can
result from labour-related issues in the supply chain, firms
engaged in offshore outsourcing are developing new ways
to ensure that their suppliers’ activities are consistent with
buyer stakeholder expectations, as expressed in policies and
procedures. Our evidence suggests that firms are increasingly moving from bilateral governance, through either coercion or cooperation, towards collective coercion characterized by collaboration with competitors and NGOs. But to
date there have been few academic studies of this collaborative governance model.
In this paper we have explored the reasons why firms
from developed countries choose to manage their suppliers
in developing countries through collaborative governance,
the use of a coalition of competitor firms and/or third-party
organisations, to alleviate negative labour conditions in
sourcing factories. Although this is a buyer strategic choice,
we also looked at the phenomenon from the supplier side to
corroborate the evidence. Our findings indicate that both
buyers and suppliers see significant evidence there are
conditions under which neither the previous arm’s-length,
top-down approach of coercion nor the trust-based cooperative approach effectively addresses the underlying causes
of the problem. From the buyer side collaborative governance is expected to offer an additional mechanism that can
help address labour issues at suppliers’ factories. Although
buyers also acknowledge the challenges that the governance mode faces in practice, the data analysis highlights that
implementation can lead to positive outcomes.
The bilateral governance model is bounded by several
limitations. First, the trust-based cooperative approach is
theoretically the best option for firms in managing labour
issues with suppliers as cooperation leads to less monitoring, more compliance, and enhanced performance outcomes
(Dyer and Singh 1998; Uzzi 1997). Yet, in practice, our analysis suggests that firms, at least those in the garment industry, are not capable of developing such relationships with all
suppliers due to the high number of suppliers with short contract periods or low sourcing value. Our analysis shows they
only can maintain such relationships with a small number of
key suppliers. Theoretically, the top-down approach is only
effective when the buyer is less dependent and, therefore,
possesses more power (Emerson 1962), and empirically, this
study confirms that serious labour issues are likely to occur
when the level of suppliers’ dependence is low.

No-Size-Fits-All: Collaborative Governance as an Alternative for Addressing Labour Issues…

Collaborative governance not only helps to exchange
knowledge and develop best practices but is also a more
effective means of coercing shared suppliers into action and
instigating their cooperation, because of greater bargaining
power and the reduction of costs due to fewer audits (Das
and Teng 2000; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). On
top of the increased power, our study further suggests that
another critical advantage of collaborative governance is to
stimulate discussion and knowledge-sharing among buyer
firms (Rondinelli and London 2003). This can result in the
pooling of resources to address labour issues.
Our interviewees did not have coherent policies to address
the underlying causes of labour issues in the supply chain,
beyond lobbying key stakeholders, such as local governments, persuasion, collaboration with suppliers, collective
threats, and forceful coercion. The question of the extent to
which collaboration and coercion mechanisms can really be
distinguished from each other provides an interesting avenue for future theoretical and empirical research. We would
expect collective coercion to weaken collaboration between
buyers and suppliers. Furthermore, suppliers could counteract increased dependence on buyer firms by moving up the
value chain and becoming direct competitors. An increase in
disposable income in emerging economies is already making
major suppliers in developing countries less reliant on western markets, and some suppliers are increasingly producing
and selling their own branded goods (Wan and Wu 2017).
We observe that the new approach will enable buyer firms
to increase their leverage based on the increased relative
power and more abundant and more accurate information
about labour practices, and suppliers may cooperate as
they see the governance mode makes business sense. But
this may not necessarily result in improvement in workers’
conditions since the problem of enforcement remains along
with the challenges associated with the management of the
partnerships between buyers and NGOs. Acknowledging
this limitation, the collaborative approach does not aim to
substitute relational governance. Firms in our study are not
letting go of the cooperative approach just yet. Interviewees indicated that continuous conversation is still an ideal
way to make changes and convince suppliers that the new
approach will eventually benefit them. This would enable
them to overcome the limitations of top-down unilateral
compliance. Using threats, such as termination of contracts,
was not emphasized, but the importance of the suppliers
making sense of improvements, as well as the effectiveness
of conversations and persuasion, were stressed.
This study acknowledges the challenges faced by the
practitioners who are willing to tackle the labour issues both
internally as well as externally. Those practitioners fighting
against the external difficulties such as institutional distance
and lack of cooperation from suppliers are also fighting
internally for more resources and monetary supports from

firms. We provide pragmatic solutions for those managers
in small buying firms by suggesting that they should collaborate with other buyers and address issues hand in hand
by increasing overall leverage.
Like any empirical work, our study has some limitations.
Our conceptual model only applies to the case where buyers are willing to tackle the labour issues in their supply
chains even in the case where they are smaller (not in terms
of absolute size, but in terms of relative size of transactions
compared with other buyers or compared to the entire production of a supplier), therefore, less powerful than supplier,
which means it is hard to generalise the findings to a wider
population. As there cannot be one size that fits all, the collaborative governance is suggested as one of the ways of
dealing with labour issues. Furthermore, because there is
still only limited evidence about the effectiveness of this
approach, we focused more on the principles of this shifting
approach, rather than its detailed practices. We believe there
is room for more structured and larger-scale research efforts.
For instance, it could be helpful to survey a larger number of
firms on their use of bilateral versus collaborative governance mechanisms, and how this relates to CSR outcomes.

Conclusion
Labour issues in global supply chains have remained unresolved for some decades now,. In this study, we have sought
to identify the factors driving buyers to join forces, as well
as collaborate with NGOs, in addressing labour issues in
suppliers’ operations. In so doing, we identified some root
causes of failure in bilateral governance, both arm’s length
and relational, and the extent to which a collaborative governance approach offers more practical and effective solutions to these issues. Our findings suggest that coercive
collaborative governance driven by buyers and practiced
through inter-firm–NGO coalitions can potentially provide
better solutions, because it increases supplier dependence in
relationships, enables buyers to share critical information,
leads to more effective supplier relationship management,
and may eventually enable higher levels of compliance. By
exploring collaborative governance as a new approach in
managing CSR in global supply chains, this research contributes to the ongoing discussions on CSR in supply chains.
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